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ABSTRACT
This article addresses “political correctness” 
(PC) regarding the rights of people with 
disabilities and specifically the state of 
the question in Spain. First, we focus on 
the expression itself and clarify what is 
understood by PC. This implies reviewing, 
albeit briefly, the main conceptual and 
ideological framework PC is grounded 
in. Second, we describe the new 
conceptualisation of disability given by the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, tasked with 
ensuring compliance with the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
In Spain, this Convention is about to give 
rise to substantial legislative reforms in 
civil and procedural matters, leading to a 
turnaround in the way the matter has been 
traditionally treated. Thirdly, we expose a 
critique of the demands to turn “functional 
diversity” into the sole politically correct 
expression to refer to the condition of 
people with disabilities. To finish, I come 
back to the question of PC and present my 
position on the effects of this doctrine on 
the prevention of discrimination against 
marginalised groups.
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1. Introduction
This article focuses on “political correctness” (hereinafter, PC) regard-
ing the rights of people with disabilities. I address the state of the matter 
specifically in Spain.
First, I concentrate on the question itself, clarifying what I understand 
by PC. For this, it is necessary to briefly review the main conceptual and 
ideological framework PC is grounded in.
Second, I describe the new conceptualisation of disability given by the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (herein-
after, the Committee), which must ensure that the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter the Convention) is complied with. 
In Spain, this Convention is about to lead to major legislative reforms in 
civil and procedural matters, representing a turnaround with respect to the 
traditional way of dealing with disability2.
Third, I expose a critique of the demands to turn “functional diversity” into 
the sole politically correct expression to refer to the condition of persons with 
disabilities. I argue that the defence of this term can be explained by political 
tactics to claim the rights of persons with disabilities. This defence, however, 
is not justified, in that to my mind, the traditional view of disability—which 
links disability to a context of disease and medicine, the so-called medical 
model— resists its criticisms. The medical model is based on a certain objec-
tivity of values as well as scientific knowledge. In the medical field, disease 
is an evil that must be prevented, but, naturally, this does not imply that sick 
people are bad; on the contrary, respect and empathy for the sick lie at the heart 
of the origin and meaning of the medical profession. This view is consistent 
with a wide range of principles underpinning our practices regarding sick 
and disabled people, including: the major role of prevention, treatment and 
rehabilitation, social medicine, public health, reverse discrimination measures, 
etc. Conversely, the model in which the “functional diversity” idea is inserted 
i.e. the social model, leads to a cascade of inconsistencies in our horizon of 
moral assessment. As the model’s very defenders often claim, it would be a 
real revolution: one that, to my mind, should not occur.
2  Draft Bill reforming civil and procedural legislation to support persons with disabilities in the exercise 
of their legal capacity. Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (Official Gazette of the Spanish Parlia-
ment), 17 July 2020, 21(1).
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To finish, I come back to the issue of PC and set out my position on the 
effects of this doctrine on the prevention of discrimination against mar-
ginalised groups.
2. The idea of political correctness
2.1. A global battlefield and different local battles
To understand the phenomenon of PC, it is necessary to place it at the 
centre of an ideological battle between Right and Left. Such a battle takes 
place on a global stage as well as in a multiplicity of local scenarios, where 
it is modulated differently.
The battle’s global setting is marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
end of the Cold War, and the triumph of global capitalism, generating major 
supra-State economic power, a network of global economic actors power-
ful beyond comprehension (Capella, 2005, 19); an industrial and military 
superpower, the United States, which is producing an ideology that serves 
its interests; and a communications network, the Internet, which, while 
allowing billions of people to interact freely, in so far as these interactions 
are not mediated or filtered by any institution, also operates as a monumental 
instrument for manipulating and deforming reality. The result is that in the 
global village’s agora, propaganda has acquired unprecedented power, while 
the critical capacities of those taking part in the communications have in 
fact only diminished (Sartori 1998).
To complete this picture, we should bear in mind that since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, other phenomena have clearly come to the fore, 
such as China’s and Russia’s consolidation of power as politically stable 
and successful —especially China—non-democratic states, with a grow-
ing capacity for global influence; the incidence (and awareness) of climate 
change; the global economic system’s fragility in relation to averting crises 
such as that of 2008; the rise of populism, both on the Right and on the 
Left, with its potential for destabilisation; the consolidation of global crime 
and terrorism networks (Ferrajoli 2006); the risk of pandemics; and finally, 
population movements, large-scale migrations from poor to rich countries. 
In addition, the lot is occurring in a world where, as pointed out by Pinker 
(2012), there are less wars and widespread violence than in the past. In this 
way, ideological and economic power have grown, correlatively.
In this global scenario, the discussions around PC take the form, on the 
Right, of an attack on an ideology that would have emerged during France’s 
May 68. This ideology would be characterised—according to this right-wing 
vision—by left-wing radicalism, which is deeply irrational and destructive of 
true social progress. It would have originated recalcitrant attitudes towards 
economic and human development. On the Left, capitalism is attacked. It 
is understood as incompatible with a whole series of demands that require 
correcting the political agenda. The Right’s idea of  progress is criticised, 
since it is based—as argued by the Left—solely on economic growth. Among 
these new political causes we find climate change, feminism, racial integra-
tion, the defence of migrants’ rights, animalism, etc. The idea of  PC on the 
global battlefront therefore alludes to an ideological controversy regarding 
the definition of progress i.e. what the essential values  underlying the idea 
of  human development are. In this context, the concept of PC plays an 
ambivalent role, since it serves both to vilify and to describe one of the two 
contenders: the left-wing contender.
According to Wilson (1995, 4), the expression PC was originally used 
ironically by the Left itself, to refer to an excessively rigid behaviour proper to 
communist orthodoxy; in other words, a form of fundamentalism. Films and 
literature have often characterised a politically correct life as one doomed to 
becoming fanatical or to dissolve, out of lack of integrity regarding its prin-
ciples. However, the use of the expression has evolved and has been assumed 
by the Left as an appropriate term to refer to one of its ideological theses 
and to a general attitude towards reality (an attitude of moral commitment).
For the Right on the other hand, PC designates a series of ideas and atti-
tudes at best immature, though well-intentioned, and at worst, an expression 
of deep moral perversity and irrationality born of envy, hatred of freedom 
and of others’ prosperity. The moral attitude of the defenders of PC, be it true 
or hypocritical, would thus oppose their opponents’ pragmatic attitude, the 
only attitude that can potentially bring some benefit to humanity.
However, I believe that this global battle is only an apparent one, or a 
“fake” one to use the language currently in circulation over networks. The 
victory of the Right came about a long time ago. The proof of this is that the 
Right has allowed itself to choose its enemy, i.e. May 68 intellectuals, and 
this enemy was as destructive of the Right’s foundations as that of the Left 
(more of the Left’s foundations I would say). Since the 1980s, the conservative 
ideological revolution, launched by Anglo-Saxon countries, has met most 
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of its objectives. Not even the overwhelming reality of potential human 
extinction due to climate change has succeeded in shaking its foundations.
The same cannot be said in other areas, whether regional areas or different 
spheres, such as the academic field. In the United States, major discussions 
have taken place around PC. It has certainly drawn a lot of attention from 
conservative think tanks, who have devoted huge amounts of resources to 
denounce PC’s anti-liberal revolution. They argue that the scope and in-
tensity of this revolution is so extensive, it poses a threat to the American 
constitutional system and, in particular, to the rights derived from the First 
Amendment (D’Souza 1991). Special attention has been given to the situation 
of universities, in particular regarding measures against racial and sexual 
discrimination. The Left, for its part, often argues that the notion of a PC 
threat is a myth created and financed by the Right and that PC does not 
possess such power, nor even that liberticidal desire, neither in the country 
nor in universities (Wilson 1995).
But, in my opinion, in contrast to the global situation, social mobilisations 
at the state level around PC issues can have a significant legal, political and 
social impact. The recent iconoclastic movement in the United States, and 
also to some extent, the “black lives matter” protests at its root, illustrate 
how PC debates can turn into concrete political actions.
2.2. Political correctness in Spain
In Spain, the notion of PC is also linked to the same spectrum of mor-
al attitudes and political positions regarding the causes referred to above. 
However, we could say that PC is more directly related to certain language 
restrictions. In fact, the Right has created a derogatory term to refer to the 
agenda one could associate with PC: political “buenismo” (goodness, or 
righteous intentions). The meaning is the same as that alluded to above: a 
well-meaning but immature attitude.
According to Alvarez Ortega, PC is a language prohibition mechanism, 
included within the same conceptual field as “taboos” or “censorship”, though 
with some differences3. According to him, PC should be understood as “a 
3  Álvarez Ortega, relying on the work of Casas Gómez (1996), argues that there are “today at least 
three different coexisting notions of linguistic taboo: 1) the original Polynesian notion, of prohibition of 
transcendent (magical-religious) origin, that implies avoiding words or else risk a transmissible con-
tamination that carries diverse negative consequences; 2) the strict western notion, of lexical elision 
for magico-religious motives (identifying mainly with the realistic perspective); 3) the generic western 
mechanism of linguistic interdiction which, with the pretext of accommodat-
ing an ideology of progress and focusing on the public visibility of minorities, 
as well as the removal of historical affronts, imposes the avoidance of units 
that allegedly carry discriminatory connotations in favour of others, allegedly 
neutral and inclusive” (Alvarez Ortega 2010, 335-336).
The two main manifestations of PC thus understood would be inclusive 
language and the use of euphemisms. With regard to the former, we have 
witnessed over the last decade in Spain a significant growth of the feminist 
movement. This movement has requested, among other things, the use of 
inclusive language—to varying degrees, depending on which feminists one 
is talking about. I believe that it is in relation to disability that euphemisms, 
for their part, have been the most extensively used or valued. Whereas as in 
other countries, it is racial issues that perhaps prevail, in Spain, the ques-
tion of PC is given most importance when referring to the state of persons 
with disabilities. Similarly, there is a general tendency to develop language 
restriction mechanisms in relation to some categories of victims of crime, 
such as victims of gender-based violence and victims of terrorism, but also, 
to a lesser degree, victims of racism. 
In Spain, PC is also at the centre of a Left-Right battle, especially between 
the radical Left and radical Right. As far as feminism is concerned, we are 
witnessing fierce confrontations and manifest extremism. The latter is not the 
subject of this article, although it cannot be completely overlooked. A thorough 
and complete presentation of the situation can be found in De Lora (2019).
The concept provided by Alvarez Ortega seems to be a good starting point. 
Various notions of PC could be projected onto his concept. In one version, 
one that is in my view as reasonable and moderate as its use is limited, the 
notion would encompass two major aspects. First, that certain disrespectful 
forms of expression have a social impact and perpetuate racial, sexual, etc. 
discrimination. This does not necessarily imply that people who use such 
forms of expression consciously assume some form of discrimination. In some 
cases, the people discriminated against themselves share use such language. 
Second, a moderate principle of non-offense is also valid, according to which 
persons belonging to discriminated groups have the right not to be offended, 
notion, which includes lexical prohibition regardless of its material and/or motivational scope”(2010, 
329). The technical use of censorship, in his opinion, would consist of a restrictive state-institutional 
measure that applies essentially to written texts (2010, 333).
Undecidabilities and Law 
The Coimbra Journal for Legal Studies 115
even if the offense consists solely in the practice of a society’s common way 
of speaking. Correlatively, it would be justifiable, if only “prima facie”, that 
speakers have an obligation to limit the use of certain expressions. Speech 
thus acquires greater moral, political and legal significance. This concept of 
PC, based on these two aspects, is fairly simple and, as I say, difficult to reject.
Nevertheless, a different concept of PC exists and it is generating a grow-
ing predicament. It would rest on two fundamental pillars: demands for a 
right to identity and an absolute interpretation of the principle according to 
which others should not be offended. This concept of PC, or ideology, does 
seriously threaten the continuity of critical thinking because, underlying 
the demands for a single language is the demand for a single thought. 
As Alvarez Ortega points out, the repercussions of extending PC, with its 
continuous resorting to euphemisms, for example, in relation to situations in 
which people suffer from illness or disability, “create a mirage of symmetry that 
can lead to claims and situations; what is more, possible ensuing discussions 
also constitute genuine political incorrectness” (Alvarez Ortega 2010, 338). In 
addition, this combination of identity demands and the no-offense principle 
paradoxically leads some traditionally right-wing groups, such as religious faiths, 
to discover that PC can also be used in their own defence. In short, based on 
this concept, PC results in turning the no-offence principle into an absolute 
principle. Thus, by merely considering that a belief or way of life, or a simple 
custom forms part of its identity, a group can claim the right to define the 
correct terms to refer to it and, ultimately, to define the terms of the discussion. 
Garzón Valdés illustrated the concept of fundamental rights using the 
notion of “preserve” of majority decisions (Garzón Valdés 1989). For Garzón 
Valdés, rights, in democracies represent a sphere that is “non-decidable” by the 
majority. Likewise, PC represents a demand for a sphere of the “non-speaka-
ble”. We explore next how this sphere is configured as well as its foundations 
regarding the subject of disability.
3. A policy of transformation of the social mindset:  
from “incapacity” to “functional diversity”
3.1. Brief description of the transformation sought after
Javier Romañach and Agustina Palacios, the latter a deep connoisseur 
(and advocate) of the social model of disability, gave the following title to 
an article they jointly wrote: “El modelo de la diversidad: una nueva visión 
de la bioética desde la perspectiva de las personas con diversidad funcional 
(discapacidad)” (“The diversity model: a new vision of bioethics from the per-
spective of people with functional diversity (disabilities)”). The first paragraph 
states that “people with functional diversity (disabilities) (...) Over certain 
periods, for example, during German Nazism, were killed in a vain attempt 
to eradicate their ‘imperfection’” (translation of Palacios & Romañach 2008, 
37). In a quick summary of discriminations that “do not die out”, the authors 
illustrate the presence of discrimination in the laws, giving the example 
of Article 417 bis of Spain’s Penal Code which allows abortion when “the 
foetus is to be born with functional diversity” (sic) (2008, 39) and that this 
is the only case for which it is allowed to extend the period of abortion to 22 
weeks. This demonstrates that the lives of people are clearly given a different 
assessment depending on whether they have functional diversity (2008, 40). 
Later, they emphasise that a conceptual confusion caused by Spain’s scarce 
implementation of the social model (at that time) is the mixing up of the 
concepts of disease and functional diversity (2008, 40). This confusion occurs 
in the context of the “rehabilitative model” or medical model of disability, 
which, according to these authors, should have already been abandoned. For 
this change—that is, the shift from the old and unacceptable rehabilitative 
model to the new model of diversity—to occur, they argue that 4: 
it is imperative to eliminate the concepts of ability or worth from our 
language and seek a new term through which a person can find an identity 
that is not perceived as negative. The term proposed and defended in the 
diversity model is that of women and men discriminated against for their 
functional diversity, in short, people with functional diversity. Since its 
inception, the term has spread rapidly and generated a new identity in 
which diversity and the enrichment that comes with it is key (Palacios 
& Romañach 2008, 41).
4  The authors refer to the wording of the crime of abortion (which is not currently in force) and which was 
introduced in Organic Law 9/1985, of 5 July, on the reform of article 417a of the Penal Code. According to 
this law, abortion will not be punishable when, among other cases, “It is presumed that the foetus will be 
born with serious physical or psychic impairments, provided that the abortion is performed within the first 
twenty-two weeks of gestation and that the opinion of two specialists, expressed prior to the practice of 
abortion, is issued by an accredited public or private health centre or facility, and by persons other than 
that by whom or under whose direction the abortion is performed”. In point 2 of the same article, the 
legal period for performing an abortion resulting from rape is 22 weeks.
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The footnote clarifies that “the term functional diversity (sic) was first 
proposed by Manuel Lobato and Javier Romañach on 12 May 2005, in message 
No. 13.457 of the Independent Living Forum” (p. 41). It is also indicated as 
a reference that in February 2007, the search for this expression in Google 
in Spanish yielded 26,000 results compared to 705 in 2005. As this article 
is written, as of September 2020, a total of 1,840,000 responses is obtained 
when performing a search for the Spanish term “diversidad funcional” (and 
2,070,000 when googling “functional diversity” in English). It is understand-
ably elating to be credited with the coining of the label.
The term “functional diversity” does not appear in the Convention. How-
ever, the text gives rise to a “social model” interpretation as it defends the 
following three characteristics of disability: (1) disability “is an evolving 
concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons 
with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers” (Preamble, 
paragraph “e”); (2) “Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with 
disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity” (Art. 3(d)); and (3) 
disability is a homogeneous notion, so the same regulation should affect 
all people who “have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full 
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others” (Art. 1). 
This Convention can also be interpreted in such a way as to be compatible 
with the traditional —and, in my view, reasonable—medical or rehabilitative 
model, but there is no doubt that the Committee responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the Convention has endorsed the social model.
In my opinion, many criticisms should be voiced on the position of this 
Committee. They should focus in particular both on its famous General 
Comment No. 1 (2014) of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (Alemany 2018), and the regulatory consequences 
of the claim to eliminate or minimise the representation of persons with 
mental and/or intellectual disabilities (Alemany 2020). I wish to point out 
here that while the Committee does not accept the terminology that these 
authors deem “essential” for the full development of the social model, all 
its considerations are in line with this model and the elimination of the 
categories of the disabled, incapacitation, guardianship, representation of 
the incapacitated, etc. The Committee advocates a support system involving 
a series of radical changes in the way disability is legally treated. Examples 
of these changes are as follow:
1) “Replace regimes based on alternative decision-making with others 
based on support to decision-making” (Comment 28).
2) “Give the same credit to the complaints and statements of persons with 
disabilities as they would to people without disabilities (...) including the 
capacity to testify in judicial, administrative and other legal proceedings” 
(Comment 39).
3) “... their detention in institutions against their will, either without their 
consent or with the consent of a substitute decision-maker, is an ongoing 
problem. This practice constitutes arbitrary deprivation of liberty and 
violates articles 12 and 14 of the Convention” (Comment 40).
4) In the area of health, “States parties have an obligation not to permit 
substitute decision-makers to provide consent on behalf of persons with 
disabilities” (Comment 41).
5) As for forced psychiatric treatments, “Forced treatment is a particular 
problem for persons with psychosocial, intellectual and other cognitive 
disabilities. States parties must abolish policies and legislative provisions 
that allow or perpetrate forced treatment” (Comment 42). (...) deinsti-
tutionalization must be achieved and legal capacity must be restored to 
all persons with disabilities, who must be able to choose where and with 
whom to live” (Comment 46).
6) “States parties have an obligation to protect and promote the right of 
persons with disabilities to access the support of their choice in voting by 
secret ballot, and to participate in all elections and referendums without 
discrimination” (Comment, 49).
In Spain, the Convention has been in force since 3 May 2008. Between 
this date and the Committee’s Comment I have just referred to, a number of 
reforms have been adopted based on the Convention. The Convention was 
still interpreted, however, as being compatible with traditional mechanisms 
for the protection of persons with disabilities, provided the disabilities were 
mental and/or intellectual. An illustration of this approach worthy of note 
is the Judgment of Spain’s Supreme Court No 282/2009, Chamber 1, of the 
Civil Court, of 29 April 2009 (Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo Español nº 
282/2009, Sala 1ª, de lo Civil, de 29 de abril de 2009). The sentence judges 
a case of incapacitation of an elderly woman at the request of her children. 
The Court accepts the forensic reports of the previous two instances: in the 
first instance, Parkinson’s disease is discovered as well as a slight cortical 
Undecidabilities and Law 
The Coimbra Journal for Legal Studies 119
atrophy with no signs of dementia and with symptoms of depression; whereas 
in the second instance, a “moderate cognitive disorder, senile dementia, 
which functionally limits the ability to be self-governing and manage her 
assets completely and permanently” is found. The prosecutor, who in Span-
ish law has the power to protect minors and persons who are incompetent, 
or “incapable” (the legal term commonly used in Spanish is “incapaces”), 
did not deny the veracity of the diagnoses but strongly argued against the 
incapacitation request based on the Convention.
 In the arguments presented before the Supreme Court, the prosecutor 
deems that the main problem with the appeal is to determine whether the 
lower court’s interpretation of Arts. 199 and 200 of the Civil Code5 is con-
sistent with the Convention, specifically with article 12 of the Convention 
(legal basis 3). In the prosecutor’s view, “the declaration of incapacity violates 
the dignity of the incapable person and that person’s right to equality by 
depriving him or her of the ability to act and is discriminative with respect 
to capable persons”. To reach this conclusion, the prosecutor adopts the con-
cept of disability assumed by the Convention, which would be a “minimum 
and open”, “dynamic” concept, “an ongoing process”, which accounts for 
the individual, biological and social dimensions of health; the prosecutor 
is referring to the “social model of disability” in contrast to the “medical or 
rehabilitative model”. According to the prosecutor, the Convention adopts 
“the social model and the principle of non-discrimination, colliding with the 
traditional representation of incapacitation, as a mechanism that replaces 
the capacity to act. It forces the “adoption” of a new instrument based on 
the support system that is projected onto the specific circumstances of the 
person, act or business to be carried out”. As a result, the Convention brings 
together “the legal capacity and capacity to act in an inseparable whole” 
and “exercises restrictions on the incapacitation instrument if the latter has 
an impact on the nullifying of the capacity to act”. Finally, the prosecutor 
proposes a solution, while reforms are made to the Spanish legal system: 
“the supervision, reinterpreted in the light of the convention, based on the 
model of support and assistance and the principle of the best interest of the 
person with disabilities”.
5  Art. 199. No one can be declared incapable, except by a judicial ruling by virtue of the causes estab-
lished in the Law; Art. 200. Causes of incapacitation are persistent physical or mental illnesses or 
deficiencies that prevent the person from being self-governing.
The answer of Chamber 1 to this reprimand of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office on the Convention’s correct interpretation is precisely based on con-
sidering the existence of a nominal question about how to refer to legal 
situations and procedures affecting persons with disabilities. The legislature 
will have to resolve this nominal issue. Yet, beyond how the question is 
resolved, mental and/or intellectual disability sometimes entails problems 
that limit the capacity for volition and comprehension. Therefore, incapac-
itation as a mechanism to protect the disabled is a requirement based both 
on the principle of the person’s dignity and the principle of equality. The 
judgment concludes:
In this way, the present interpretation is the only one that renders the 
current regulation appropriate according to the Convention. Thus, the 
protection system established in the Civil Code remains in force, though 
based on the following proposed reading:
1. Always taking into consideration that incapable persons retain their 
fundamental rights and their incapacitation is only a form of protection. 
This is the only possible interpretation of Article 200C and Article 760.1 
LEC.
2. Incapacitation is not a discriminatory measure because situations that 
call for protection present their own specific characteristics. We are refer-
ring to persons the intellective and volition powers of whom do not allow 
them to exercise their rights as persons because they prevent them from 
self-government. The system is therefore not a family protection system, 
but a system of protection only of the person concerned (Legal basis 7).
On 17 July 2020, the Draft Bill reforming civil and procedural legislation 
for the support of persons with disabilities in the exercise of their legal capacity 
entered the Spanish Congress of Deputies. This project does not use the 
“functional diversity” label and maintains the apparently politically correct 
term: “people with disabilities”. However, this is not the nominal solution 
given by the legislature that was assumed by the Supreme Court judges. 
It constitutes rather an incorporation of the social model into our system 
and, to some extent, the acceptance of the idea of “functional diversity”. 
The triumph of the thesis of Palacios and Romañach is complete in the pars 
destruens. Indeed, the terms “incapacitation” and “incapable” have been 
completely removed from the draft’s articles and, if the reform takes place, 
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from Spain’s future Civil Code and Law on Civil Procedure—in the same 
way that guardianship is only contemplated in the case of minors. 
In the Preamble, the legislator, as if he were remembering the judges’ 
words pronounced in 2009, clarifies that 
it is not, therefore, a mere change in terminology that replaces the tradi-
tional terms of “incapacity” and “incapacitation” with more precise and 
respectful ones, but a new and more accurate approach to reality, that 
raises awareness about a matter that has long gone unnoticed: persons 
with disabilities hold the right to make their own decisions, a right to be 
respected; the issue is therefore a human rights issue. 
Later, he advocates a transformation of the social mindset “based on the 
new principles and not on the paternalistic visions that are now out of date”. 
3.2. Criticism of a PC’s shift towards the social model 
The article of Palacios and Romañach reveals how the authors put the 
term “disability” in parentheses together with the expression “functional 
diversity”. They do so undoubtedly to reach more readers or, in other words, 
to let them know what they are talking about. Often, a problem of inclusive 
language and euphemisms is that most speakers do not put them into practice. 
Thus, the terms are locked away within academic or activist circles, thus 
raising the paradoxical risk of generating a subculture, when the idea is in 
fact to influence the idiosyncrasies of society at large.
The terms “handicapped”, “the disabled” or “crippled” have been replaced 
by the expressions “disabled persons” or “persons with disabilities”; more-
over, in legal fields, the intention is to eliminate the term of “incapable” or 
“incapacitated” in relation to some mental and/or intellectual disabilities. 
In the general culture, as well as in legal culture, other terms have been 
used in the past that are now considered grossly pejorative. A paradigmatic 
example is the famous 1927 U.S. Supreme Court Judgment Buck v. Bell case. 
Discussing the mandatory sterilisation of people with mental disabilities, 
Judge Holmes concludes in favour of it, commenting that “Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough”. Holmes’ arguments were not as unacceptable as 
these words suggest, but the comment is undoubtedly disrespectful towards 
people affected by the constitutionality judgment. Naturally, today, they 
appear insulting.
Therefore, it is clearly justified to apply the PC doctrine’s removal of dis-
paraging terms and expressions in a given language context. In reality, PC, 
thus understood, departs little from the traditional concept of freedom of 
expression as a right to which limitations apply, including that of not insulting 
or slandering others, at least publicly. However, it is a different matter when 
PC attempts to restrict or eliminate the use of terms or expressions that are 
only pejorative once a particular approach has been assumed, in the present 
case, regarding disability. I am referring to a perspective that rests on a series 
of principles and premises which are not at all shared by the community 
of speakers (often, not even within the discriminated minority) and whose 
acceptance, in fact, would entail an in-depth review of many practices that 
are generally deemed to be justified. In this sense, the expression PC operates 
as a wedge that cuts through established custom, more or less inadvertently. 
In other words, they resemble new premises more than conclusions based on 
established premises. I believe the term “functional diversity” to be of this 
nature. It does not consist of adopting a perspective on disability rights, but of 
a new premise that is difficult to fit into many other generally accepted ones. 
As advocates of functional diversity point out, the enemy to beat is the 
medical or rehabilitative model. According to this latter model, the concept 
of disease is basic and the concept of disability derives from it. The Interna-
tional Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH), 
proposed by the World Health Organization in the 1980s, clearly responds 
to this model (WHO 1980).  According to this classification, disability is 
the manifestation of impairments that are found in the body of the person 
with a disability—they are somatic. The given definition of disability is as 
follows: “any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to 
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal 
for a human being”(WHO 1980, 28). The disease, as a somatic condition, is 
the efficient cause, in the Aristotelian sense (Riese 1953, 69), of impairments 
in parts of the body that are necessary, although not sufficient, conditions 
of disability (Edwards 2017, 150). In the ICIDH’s conception, disability is 
linked to the field of health, the body and, ultimately, medical practice. For 
their part, the social aspects that can affect the quality of life of those with a 
disability are conceptually separated: they would consist of social difficulties 
and handicaps. For example, polio is a disease that can affect motor neurons, 
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causing paralysis (an impairment) that prevents the patient from walking (a 
disability), which, depending on the social context, level of wealth, means 
available, etc., will be a major or minor handicap to carrying out a life plan. 
Contrary to popular belief, this approach does not ignore the social aspects 
that affect sick and disabled people. In fact, within medical practice, the 
discipline of social medicine has a long tradition, which has emphasised the 
social aspects of illness and its consequences.
Consequently, to my mind, when describing the disability model panorama 
as a scale that goes from centring on the individual’s psychosomatic factors 
to focusing on contextual or social factors, saying that the ICIDH is at one 
extreme can lead to confusion (Braddock and Parish 2001; Edward 2017). 
Quite the reverse: nothing at the “individualistic” extreme corresponds to 
some versions of the social model that do seem to have reached an extreme. 
The reason for this is that the ICIDH is a reasonable proposal and, as such, 
it takes the social aspects of illness and disability into consideration; in fact, 
as Shakespeare points out, this classification was originally an attempt to 
give more importance to the social consequences of the impairments caused 
by the disease (Shakespeare 2014, 15).
The problem with this medical model cannot be, therefore, that it ignores 
the social conditions of disease and disability, and even less that it ignores 
the individual affected by the disease and disability. The problem, in my 
opinion, is that, in the first place, this model does not fit well with the political 
tactics of certain activists; the model is about forging, so to speak, the most 
appropriate doctrine to accelerate and transform the situation of people 
with disabilities (Oliver 1990). Secondly, the biomedical concept of disease 
and the scientific concept of medicine generally is not compatible with the 
very influential doctrine of social constructivism and philosophy’s relapse 
into powerful—both epistemological and axiological—subjectivism. Both 
lines of criticism converge in the identity concept of disability. Based on this 
latter concept, the fight for the equality of the disabled (since it would no 
longer be politically correct to speak of “people with disabilities”, as if it were 
a contingent property of the individual; Oliver 1990, p. xiii) is assimilated 
with the fight against sexual or racial discrimination.
From the perspective of political tactics, the insistence to eliminate bio-
medical notions of disease and disability from the narrative seems to suggest 
that the element of deviation from normality that, indeed, is intrinsic to this 
biomedical perspective, carries with it a “moral deviation”. Consequently, we 
fall back on the classical conception of disease as an unnatural disposition, 
according to which “without health there is no possible ethics” (Gracia 2008, 
36) and an unacceptable conclusion is assumed: that qualifying someone as 
“sick” is an insult.
From a philosophical standpoint, there are many reasons to criticise 
social constructivism in this matter (even though it is also very useful for 
political tactics). Manuel Atienza brings up the opinion of Mario Bunge on 
this issue, according to which constructivism is a mere destructive fashion 
of the Humanities faculties that is “as false as it is dangerous” (Atienza 2016, 
265; Bunge 2009, 161). It would be a question of affirming that diseases are 
“inventions of the medical profession”.
Adopting a sociological approach to the concept of disease, Freidson 
points out that it may or may not be based on a biological reality (Freidson 
1978, 215). Let us consider, for example, Parsons’ conceptual approach to the 
“sick person role”, characterised by four elements: 1) it involves a disability 
the individual cannot be held responsible for and which cannot be cured 
by one’s own will-power, a healing process is necessary; 2) the person is 
exempted from normal obligations due to the condition; 3) it consists of a 
deviation, but a legitimate deviation; and 4) the patient is expected to seek 
help to recover and cooperate in his or her own recovery (Parsons 1951, 
229). Parsons presupposes that the disease has been diagnosed according 
to the medical profession’s criteria, but these criteria are situated from the 
profession’s internal standpoint. The criteria are not of sociologists’ direct 
interest. If attraction towards one’s own sex is socially classified as a disease 
called “homosexuality”, the sociologist will consider it from that point of 
view, regardless of whether it is a significant medical error. Conversely, an 
individual’s condition, which is a disease from a biomedical viewpoint, may 
not be considered as such from a social standpoint, as was the case in some 
indigenous communities in South America where syphilis was endemic and 
its manifestations were deemed normal (Gil 1969, 31). However, logically, 
the sociological approach does not deny the possible biomedical foundations 
of the qualification of a situation as a disease or disability (in the previous 
example, the reality of endemic spirochetosis); specifically, modern medicine 
would be characterised by its claim to be a science and to have scientific 
foundations, compared to other practices that it deems irrational.
This does not mean that medicine is exempt from evaluation. This is a 
key point in the discussion: I believe that it is not sufficiently justified to 
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assimilate evaluative with subjective. From there, the step of assimilating 
evaluative with political is taken too easily; let us recall the title of Oliver’s 
book The Politics of Disablement, which reminds us of Carol Hanisch’s com-
monplace expression, so valuable for contemporary feminism: “the personal 
is political”. It also reminds us of De Lora’s book Sexual is political (and legal), 
although the latter adopts a critical approach (De Lora 2019). Medicine is 
a praxis in the Aristotelian sense: a professional practice that incorporates 
certain values  that give it meaning and social justification6. Fundamentally, 
medicine is oriented towards avoiding certain harm to individuals. What 
counts as “harm”? “Harm” is any “setback to interest” (Feinberg 1984, 31) 
and “interests” are more stable than mere desires. They represent stakes 
that individuals have in certain “goods”, so according to the extent to which 
these interests are more or less satisfied, the individual “gains” more or less. 
Some interests are only interests because the subjects make them their own, 
they are purely subjective. Others are objective, even if the individuals do 
not make them their own. This latter case includes all the interests that by 
their very nature are an objective condition for the possibility of subjective 
interests (Nino 1989): for example, the interest in staying alive.
A large part of human beings’ objective interests are linked to the hu-
man species’ condition of animal. The absence of pain or disability, staying 
alive or avoiding death are human beings’ objective interests (Culver & Gert 
1982, 27). For this reason, disease is an evil, a harmful condition, a state 
that it is rational to avoid. The condition of “disease” summarises evil for 
the human being, as “soma”. Mental illness is also somatic, one might say 
“psychosomatic”, as a brain disorder. The basic notion of disease is the one 
that delimits medicine’s “battlefield” against these evils (the criminal law 
6  The notion of “praxis” is fundamental. I believe that philosophers generally share the same idea of 
praxis: roughly speaking, a social practice oriented to certain ends and values. To interpret the deonto-
logical notion of profession (an expression of “professional deontology”, that is ultimately a pleonasm) 
it is now a classic to go to the concept of “praxis”: Adela Cortina, for example, after defining “practice” 
as a “social cooperative activity that is characterised by tending to achieve goods that are internal to 
itself and that can be provided by no other”, affirms that professions are “practical” in this sense. From 
this follows that, first, not all occupational activities are professions, and second, medicine is naturally a 
profession, in which the “internal good” is the “good of the patient.” See Cortina (1997). The problem is 
that outside philosophical circles, that is, where most of those directly involved in bioethical questions 
operate, “praxis” or “practice” is understood as that which is opposed to theory or what is theoretical 
(which is the meaning provided in the dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy (RAE). Kant allows us 
to acknowledge that this opposition is nothing more than a false opposition, but since Kant’s writings 
are not widely disseminated, it is worth noting that when we speak of medical “praxis” or “practice” we 
seek to describe all that is medicine: the medical technique, theory and ethics. See Kant (1999).
system also protects life and equality, yet it does not fight disease, it fights 
criminal conduct).
It is useful to distinguish between the concept of disease and its concep-
tions. What has been said so far refers to the concept of disease: a pathological 
condition of the body that produces (or increases the risk of suffering) any 
of the following ills: suffering, loss of the ability to experience pleasure, 
limitation of a healthy body’s capacity, shortening of life or death.
The various conceptions of illness are different explanations of it: an im-
balance that breaks the harmony of the body in the Platonic or cosmological 
conception (described in the Timaeus); a malaise caused by the lack of ed-
ucation regarding eating habits as in Hippocratic thought; or, according to 
Rousseau, the opposite, that is, the consequence of the pathological effect of 
civilisation on man’s original and healthy nature; a manifestation of sin, of 
the immoral nature of the sick; an altered functioning of some of the parts 
of the body; the presence of foreign bodies, be they demons or germs, that 
harm the body; a social condition that is the result of discrimination against 
a minority; etc. (Riese 1953).
An adequate conception of disease depends, in turn, on what an adequate 
interpretation of medical practice would be, which needs to be considered 
in its context and within a particular problem horizon. The procedures of 
Homeric Greece’s medicine—of a homeopathic nature and contrary-based 
cures, based on the principles “similia similibus, contraria contrariis”—well 
deserve to be considered “medicine” as long as the knowledge of disease and 
human experience remain within the forms of life and spirit of the ancients 
(Gil 1969). The passage from myth to logos determines a new understanding 
of medicine, which implies, first of all, a distinction between folk medicine 
and technical medicine and, over time, as from the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, a form of scientific medicine (Bunge 2017, 44). One cannot 
understand medical practice without understanding the concept of “progress 
in medicine.” According to Bunge, this progress is mainly characterised by 
the adoption of scientism, with the consequent rejection of anti-science 
and pseudoscience; the close union of medicine with basic biology; the 
adoption of the experimental method, in particular randomised trials; 
the search for mechanisms of action, in particular aetiologies; and the 
tacit adoption of emergentist and systemic materialism (translated from 
Bunge 2017, 58).
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To conclude, the modern understanding of medicine presupposes a bio-
medical conception of disease, which is based on a scientific explanation of 
the body’s normal functioning and, correlatively, on a medical treatment of 
the deviation from normality when it carries some of the evils that medical 
practice must avoid.
This defence of the medical model and therefore the criticism of the 
conception of the “functional diversity” label and of the social model of 
disability, does not imply that one incurs in any of the errors below (contrary 
to what is usually affirmed):
1) It does not deny the fact that, from a sociological perspective, some 
“diseases” or “disabilities”, that is, behaviours or situations that are socially 
considered legitimate deviations from normality and that must be “cured”, 
may be biomedically unfounded; they may be pure social constructions 
(as, for example, “individualism” under the Stalinist regime). With respect 
to mental illnesses, we must be particularly attentive to the influence of 
social morality when qualifying behaviour as pathological. But this only 
means that an operational definition of disease will necessarily offer a 
well-defined scope of application (a set of clear cases that deserve to be 
considered diseases from a biomedical point of view—for example, ma-
laria—and what should not be considered a disease from this same point 
of view—for example, gender, race or childhood— and a series of cases in 
the twilight zone (for example, controversial “paraphilias”). But neither 
this conceptual problem, nor the various links between medicine, values 
and social circumstances imply, as is claimed, that social constructivism 
theses are true.
2) In the same way, the medical model does not deny the complexity of 
the operational criteria duality for the concept of normal/abnormal and 
functional/dysfunctional disease (Chadwick 2017), nor does it say that 
evaluative questions are alien to them. But the model does contest that, 
in modern medical practice, these criteria are merely social constructs, 
even in the case of mental illness. As has just been pointed out, the 
qualification of “abnormality” may conceal, as indicated by Dupré and 
others (Dupré 1998), purely a manifestation of the transgression of social 
norms, but this is not necessarily the case.
3) The model does not imply a negative evaluation of sick or disabled 
people. The fact that disability is an evil does not mean that people with 
disabilities are bad, nor does it mean that the existence of disabled people 
is necessarily painful or that their life is meaningless or worthless. As 
Laín Entralgo points out, when reporting the personalisation process of 
the disease, the person can face it in two different genuine and opposite 
ways: aversion and assumption (1981, 146). In the latter case, the essentially 
afflictive character of the disease may also take on a positive dimension, 
of benefit to the person, either of an immaterial nature (the blessedness 
of suffering for the religious, the strength of character resulting from 
overcoming, etc.), or a material nature (the pension obtained due to the 
illness, withdrawal from daily work, etc.). But this positive and subjective 
dimension of the disease does not put into question its objectively bad 
nature. It takes it for granted: happiness, improvement, compensation, 
etc., come because the evil is assumed, overcome, compensated, etc. In 
this sense, the process of identification with the condition of the disabled 
(now a substantive condition, not an adjective) is not denied by the medical 
model of disability, it is situated at a different level. But identifying it with 
the category of “functional diversity” would mean blurring all the problems 
generated by the condition of disabled people. Hence, some associations 
such as COCEMFE (Spanish Confederation of People with Physical and 
Organic Disabilities) advise against the use of “functional diversity”. It 
considers it a euphemism loaded with condescension, which generates 
confusion as “we are all diverse” and it detracts “from the problem of 
having a disability” (COCEMFE and Parliament of Navarra 2019, 5).
4) Finally, my position does not deny the value of individual autonomy 
nor the importance of groups to defend their interests. It does not entail 
unjustified medical paternalism, nor does it call into question the im-
portance of the participation of people with disabilities in the political 
and legal decision-making that directly affects them. However, it does 
challenge the thesis, widespread today, that a given group’s representation 
can only be conducted by those belonging to that same group. Or, stated 
in terms of representation theory, the practical representation of interests 
can be exercised by individuals or institutions that are not representative, 
in a non-practical sense (Lifante Vidal 2018; Pitkin 1985). This thesis is 
essential to protect the interests of people affected by some types (and 
degrees) of mental and/or intellectual disability that seriously under-
mine their autonomy. Perhaps the most objectionable series of postulates 
that make up the “social model” is that of the unitary treatment of the 
phenomenon of disability. The identity conception of disability and the 
Undecidabilities and Law 
The Coimbra Journal for Legal Studies 129
denial of the possibility of representation eclipses the existence of diversity 
within disability and, as a result, the fact that there is inevitably a practi-
cal representation of interests among people in different circumstances: 
generally, the representation of people with mental and/or intellectual 
disabilities by people with physical and/or sensory disabilities.  
4. PC and the fight for equality
To finish, I will come back to the general question of PC. Ayim (1998) 
clearly outlined, in my view, the arguments against PC. First, there would be 
the arguments against the ideological content of PC: the PC movement has 
resulted in a threat to freedom of expression, especially to academic freedom 
(whether regarding contents or in the way of teaching, as well as research 
restrictions) (Ayim 1998, 453-459). Second, a series of arguments is related to 
the methods employed by PC advocates: they ultimately end up applying the 
same sort of discrimination they wish to denounce and they use unacceptable 
methods (such as escraches—direct action demonstrations—, or using force 
to stop someone from speaking, etc.) (Ayim 1998, 459-461). As I indicated 
from the outset, these criticisms are assessed in a highly contextualised 
manner, in the sense that their degree of relevance depends on the specific 
case. The reason is that PC acceptability depends on its extent and form.
It is a matter of achieving a balance between freedom of expression and the 
interests of other people. In my view, gender-oriented inclusive language, for 
example, seriously undermines a principle of economy of words and hinders 
communication, without contributing much in the other direction, that is, 
in promoting equality between men and women. The main problem is that 
the interests one can weigh against freedom of expression are understood to 
justify an almost absolute principle of not offending third parties. According 
to this principle, it is enough for a group—the identity of which rests on its 
own will to be understood as a group—to feel offended, for this feeling to be 
regarded as a major reason for a sanction. The form of this sanction may be 
the diffuse social sanction of rejection (which can reach notably high levels 
of coercion through social media), or the concentrated form of sanction of 
(public or private) institutions or, even more seriously, criminal sanction.
Accepting a principle of offense as I have just described does not serve 
groups that are considered progressive only, far from it. In Spain, the cross-
fire of offended feelings is becoming so intense that artists, for example, are 
increasingly calling for a return to the situation of a couple of decades ago; 
as Vazquez points out (2010, 334-335), by removing irreverence or even the 
desecration of taboos, one is emptying artistic freedom of its value.
When I completed the first section of this article, I went to Garzón Valdés 
to suggest the idea that PC corresponded to the sphere of the “non-speak-
able”, a preserve of freedom of expression. This same author gave a very 
clear conceptualisation of tolerance, emphasising that tolerance only made 
sense if what is not tolerable is acceptably delimited (Garzón Valdés 1993). 
Thus, in a first basic valuation system, the fact of saying something can be 
deemed reprehensible, while in a second valuation system, the same words 
are not considered sufficiently reprehensible to deserve to be prohibited and/
or punished. The second system incorporates both justification and limits to 
tolerance. In the PC battlefield, there is a marked tendency for supporters to 
believe that no circumstances allow for a given utterance, and for opponents 
to believe that no circumstances justify such intolerance. I must stress that 
the right balance is a matter of degree. The just balance is flexible, contextual 
and the limits are undefined. As in the case of almost all issues concerning 
freedom and equality.
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